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Summary 
This paper focuses on the damage – and the potential for inflicting further damage – to investor 
confidence arising from legal uncertainties surrounding renewable energy support in some EU 
member states. A higher-than-expected expansion of the renewables sector, resulting in higher 
costs of the support, combined with the financial crisis, has driven some member states to 
radically curtail renewable energy support schemes. Loss-making investors unsuccessfully 
challenged these EU governments in national courts, arguing that their rights had been violated 
and denounced reforms that they considered to be retroactively punitive in nature. A number 
of EU-based international investors turned to international arbitration courts under the 
provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), which protects cross-border investment in the 
energy sector. This move, however, has called into question the legal framework of the single 
market and EU state aid rules. A dispute on the jurisdiction of the ECT within the single market 
has ensued, which highlights a complex and unresolved situation. While the legal disputes 
accumulate, the concern is that investors may shy away from the EU as a result of the 
regulatory and legal uncertainties. The main aim of the paper is to provide some clarity for non-
specialists on a complex situation, and to highlight the need to find workable solutions that de 
facto restore investor confidence.  
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1. Introduction 
If the EU is to achieve its 2020, 2030 and longer-term climate objectives, it is crucial for the 
member states to adopt renewable energy on a large scale, which in turn depends on the 
sector’s ability to continue to attract private-sector capital from across the EU and beyond. The 
renewable energy Directive (2009/28/EC) (2009 RE Directive) promotes the increase of the 
share of renewable energy in the EU’s energy mix and sets an EU-wide target equal to 20% 
renewable energy in the energy mix by 2020. In parallel with the legislative proposal for that 
Directive, the European Commission adopted State aid guidelines (the so-called 2008 
Environment Guidelines).1 These stipulate that the Commission will authorise the necessary 
State aid to implement those objectives but must ensure that there is no overcompensation, 
although compensation paid may include a reasonable profit. Neither the 2008 Environmental 
Guidelines nor their successor (the 2014 Energy and Environmental Guidelines2), however, 
create an entitlement to receiving such State aid.  
The Directive states in its introductory clause, para. 25: “One important means to achieve the 
aim of this Directive is to guarantee the proper functioning of national support schemes (…) in 
order to maintain investor confidence and allow Member States to design effective national 
measures for target compliance.” In combination with the authorisation of State aid by the 
Commission, the Directive prioritised dispatch and mandated grid access. This resulted in a 
significant increase in support to renewable energy sources (RES) in the EU member states, 
which in turn succeeded in attracting considerable private investment. 
Starting in 2010, private investors’ confidence in RES policies and commitments began to wane 
as a result of actions taken by the member states. Significant policy reversals have had negative 
effects on the financial sustainability of RES projects, leading in some cases to a decrease in 
private investment. The most drastic reversals occurred in Spain with successive reforms from 
2010 onwards, particularly in the solar PV sector. To a lesser extent, the Czech Republic, 
Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Italy also introduced reforms between 2010 and 2016, which 
altered the investment environment for the renewable sector and resulted in reductions in new 
renewable installations in those countries. 
                                                     
1 OJ 2008 C 82/1. On reasonable profit, see point 109, which refers to a “normal return on capital”.  
2 OJ 2014 C 200/1. On reasonable profit, see point 129, which refers to “full depreciation”.  
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Investors have launched several legal challenges in national courts, claiming that the policy 
changes were retroactive in nature and breached legitimate expectations – but without 
success, apart from one instance in Bulgaria.3 Other Supreme Courts, notably in the Czech 
Republic, Italy and Spain, found that the changes were not retroactive as they applied only to 
future payments. As a result, both domestic and cross-border investors consider that they 
cannot obtain appropriate protection in member states’ national courts. A detailed 
introduction to the situation addressed in this paper is presented in Egenhofer et al. (2016). 
This report argues that the current situation creates a sort of legal limbo for these investors. 
This dilemma arises from a combination of factors linked to the exclusive competence of the 
European Commission on State aid, which according to investors hinders national courts to 
determine objectively whether investors’ legitimate expectations have been violated.4 
Renewable energy investors have found an alternative to national courts by turning to 
independent international arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). The energy sector 
benefits from a specific international regime governing investor-State disputes – the Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT)5 – which provides that when an investor from one State party to the ECT 
makes an investment in another ECT State, the investor can have recourse to international 
arbitration to recover damages against the host State for i) nationalisation or expropriation, ii) 
discriminatory treatment and iii) breach of legitimate expectations (also known as fair and 
equitable treatment). The European Union and all EU member states are signatories (Italy has 
since withdrawn).  
The European Commission’s legal services and the respondent EU member states, however, 
have challenged the applicability of the ECT within the EU, for legal reasons that will be 
described in this paper.  
Investor-State arbitration is complex, lengthy and costly, and to date only four cases – three 
against Spain and one against the Czech Republic – have been completed. In the first two 
Spanish cases, which concerned initial policy changes starting in 2010, the arbitrators held that 
the limited 2010 changes were not extensive enough to constitute expropriation or a breach 
of legitimate expectations. In a second arbitration from the same investor on the post-2010 
changes, the arbitrators also found that standards were not met.6 The same happened in the 
Czech case. However, the situation is taking a new turn as the first case regarding policy reforms 
introduced in Spain from 2012 onwards was found to constitute a breach of the ECT’s 
                                                     
3 Constitutional Court of Bulgaria, Resolution N13/31.07.2014. See State aid decision SA.44840 (2016/NN) – 
Bulgaria Support for renewable energy generation in Bulgaria, paragraph 31. 
4 In addition, when a State aid is not notified, it cannot be challenged in national courts as it was never approved 
in the first place. 
5 Energy Charter Secretariat, “The International Energy Charter Consolidated Energy Charter Treaty – with Related 
Documents”, Brussels, January 2016. 
6 In both cases, these were 2-1 decisions. 
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guarantee of fair and equitable treatment, and damages were awarded to the investors7 (this 
case is currently under appeal). As more than 30 claims relating to the same post-2012 changes 
are still in the arbitration process, these may similarly succeed. However, because awards 
themselves are in essence compensation for renewable support schemes that are subject to 
State Aid rules (including the exemptions under the 2009 RE Directive and later State Aid 
Guidance), the European Commission considers that the awards are subject to Commission 
review and approval as State Aid. Absent such approval, such compensation could in principle 
not be paid out. On the other hand, arbitration awards are nevertheless binding, and claimants 
will most likely seek the enforcement of damages both inside and outside the EU, which in 
practice may mean the impounding of assets owned by the respondent state and located in 
any country covered by the ECT. Furthermore, the ECT has successfully protected European 
investors vis-à-vis non-EU countries. This raises questions as to the logic of providing a 
seemingly higher level of protection for EU investors in non-EU countries than is provided 
within the EU single market. There is, however, a serious caveat regarding cases of investors 
within the single market against EU governments, as the ECT only applies to cross-border 
investors. Domestic investors (e.g. Spanish investors in Spain) cannot therefore make use of 
arbitration under the ECT. 
Regardless of the merits of the European Commission’s argument about jurisdiction and the 
legality of the awards granted by arbitration courts, investors are witnessing a protracted 
period of uncertainty regarding their legal rights when confronted with the impact of sudden 
modifications to the support for existing investments. Investors appear to be the somewhat 
forgotten collateral damage of a contradictory legal situation. As a result, investment in 
renewable energy in some member states has slowed down considerably, possibly negatively 
affecting the EU’s ability to meet its climate and energy policy objectives. 
Section 2 of this paper addresses the possible impacts on EU emissions reductions and 
renewable energy targets. Section 3 explains why investors turn to international arbitration 
tribunals. Section 4 presents some potential steps to address the situation and section 5 gives 
a summary and conclusions. Because most of the concluded international arbitration cases to 
date concern Spain, the paper principally draws examples from that country. Research for this 
paper is based on existing literature, case law and interviews with experts, including 
international lawyers, academics and officials, several of whom requested not to be cited by 
name. The conclusions presented in this report reflect only the views of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the interviewees.  
2. RES trends and RES targets and the importance of investor confidence 
The damage caused by policy reversals to RES support may harm the reputation of the EU as 
an attractive place for investing in renewables, especially in those countries that have 
                                                     
7 In a 3-0 decision. 
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introduced radical changes to their support policies. The situation is aggravated by the 
prevailing state of the legal uncertainty or ‘limbo’.  
Despite the legally binding national renewables targets set out in the 2009 RE Directive, the 
stability of the investment framework in member states plays a very important role. The failure 
to provide a solution to the problem of a deteriorating investment climate in some EU member 
states may jeopardise the achievement of the 2020 renewables target, as well the ambitions 
set out towards 2030. In its latest Renewable Energy Progress Report,8 the European 
Commission concludes that the “vast majority of EU countries are well on track to reach their 
2020 binding targets for renewable energy, but all countries will have to continue their efforts 
to meet these targets”. The Commission mentions that only three member states, France, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg, are falling behind their plans. This statement may be true for 
2020, but it is misleading for the long term. Those member states that have introduced abrupt 
changes to their support systems may find it difficult to attract investment in renewables to 
meet whatever national targets they have set themselves. The situation and trends in a number 
of member states could mean that even if the EU as a whole achieves its 27% renewables target 
by 2030, the distribution of RES across the EU may be very uneven, as investors may shy away 
from those member states in which confidence in the investment climate has deteriorated.9 
Data from Bloomberg10 already seems to suggest that renewable investment is increasingly 
concentrated in a few member states, such as Germany, Denmark, France and the UK.  
Whether targets are met or not, however, is not the main concern of this paper. Changes to 
support policy will not necessarily lead to the non-achievement of targets, at least where 2020 
targets are concerned. In addition, member states may fail to reach their targets but 
nevertheless take remedial action in line with the spirit of the Directive. Legitimate concerns 
arise, however, if member states move counter to the Directive’s spirit regarding investor 
confidence. Indeed, despite the fact that neither the Directive nor general principles of Union 
law prohibit the modification of future payments under support schemes, including for existing 
installations, permitting such modifications may undermine these provisions. Published 
arbitration awards under the ECT give detailed analysis on how some State aid reforms have 
infringed individual investors’ rights, but they do not address questions of EU law, in particular 
State aid law. The challenge is to find, given the problem at hand, a European solution that 
either prevents governments from introducing State aid reforms that infringe investors’ rights 
                                                     
8 COM(2017) 57 of 1.2.2017 
9 There are contradictory developments in the case of Spain. New RES capacity has quickly sold in auctions held 
by the government, despite the negative investment framework. This could reflect the belief on the part of 
investors that the Spanish State will soon have to reverse its decisions and introduce a more favourable policy. 
The sales of capacity allow the government to claim that the path to 2020 is being maintained, while the actual 
implementation of the project may be less than certain. 
10 Bloomberg, “New Energy Outlook 2017”, Bloomberg New Energy Finance, June 2017. 
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or establishes an appropriate litigation mechanism to allow for a quick resolution of claims by 
investors (both domestic and cross-border). 
3. On legal uncertainty in the EU and why investors are resorting to international 
arbitration 
The financial losses caused by the substantial reduction in the profitability of many existing RES 
projects in member states has led investors to claim that the reforms have violated “legitimate 
expectations of fair and equitable treatment”, that they were retroactive in nature, and had in 
some instances an impact equivalent to expropriation. The cases brought to national courts 
were unsuccessful in the Czech Republic, Italy and Spain. In the Czech Republic and Italy, the 
Constitutional Courts ruled that there had been no violation of legitimate expectations and that 
the modifications did not have retroactive effect. The European Commission came to the same 
view when assessing this matter. 
Even in the national context, however, the Spanish Supreme Court rulings concerning the 
harshest post-2012 reforms reveal that the issue is divisive, as three out of seven judges 
dissented from the decisions. Two judges wrote that the changes were de facto retroactive, 
and one judge wrote that the changes violated Spanish legal norms of ‘legal certainty’ and 
‘legitimate trust’.11 Investors felt that their legitimate rights were not being addressed fairly, 
while in other countries the trust in the independence and adequacy of the national courts has 
been seen as limited12.  
As a result, both EU-based and non-EU-based cross-border investors have brought their cases 
to international arbitration tribunals under Article 26 of the ECT on the claim that the States 
concerned are in breach of their obligations under Articles 10 and 1313 of the ECT.  
Prior to the changes in renewable support policies in EU member states, out of approximately 
30 arbitrations under the ECT, there were no international arbitration cases brought by an EU 
investor against an EU member state.14 The situation today is very different, with over 40 ECT 
claims filed against EU member states, most of which have been brought by EU-based 
investors, and the rest by Asian or Middle Eastern investors. Of those, the majority15 have been 
                                                     
11 See R. Rincón, “El Supremo avala el recorte de 1.700 millones de Rajoy a las renovables”, El País, 1 June 2016. 
12 A fact recognised by the European Commission in the case of Bulgaria and Romania: See European Commission 
reports on the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism.   
13 Article 10 requires governments to give fair and equitable treatment, thereby providing fundamental stability 
to investors. This does not exclude the possibility of reasonable changes to policies, but it does not allow radical 
alterations to regimes applied to existing investments. Article 13 identifies the case of unlawful expropriation. 
14 Some cases have been brought against EU member states, but these took place prior to their accession. 
15 The ECT website only lists 32 cases until December 2016, but interviews indicated that another five have been 
submitted in the intervening period up to end of June 2017. 
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lodged against Spain (i.e. the country that has introduced the most radical changes in its RES 
support), only three of which have been concluded. 
According to representatives of the investors, the use of the (financially costly) international 
arbitration option is the result of the inadequate protection provided by the member states 
and the lack of engagement of the EU institutions. At the same time, there are a number of 
grounds on which the European Commission and the sued member states can mount a 
challenge to the jurisdiction of the ECT within the EU. While the stance of the European 
Commission upsets investors, there is a potential legal conflict between EU State Aid law and 
the ECT. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 below give an overview of the basic causes for the present 
situation, based on information provided by the interviewees. 
3.1 Why is the ECT important? 
The adoption of the Energy Charter dates back to the early 1990s, with the aim of overcoming 
previous Cold War economic divisions and developing energy cooperation among the states of 
Eurasia.  
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT),16 signed in December 1994 and entered into force in April 
1998, establishes legally-binding multilateral rules “to provide a more balanced and efficient 
framework for international cooperation than is offered by bilateral agreements alone or by 
non-legislative instruments”.17 It is intended to play a “role as part of an international effort to 
build a legal foundation for energy security, based on the principles of open, competitive 
markets and sustainable development”.18 Its fundamental aim is “to strengthen the rule of law 
on energy issues, by creating a level playing field of rules to be observed by all participating 
governments, thereby mitigating risks associated with energy-related investment and trade”.19 
To date, there are 54 signatories, including 52 states, the European Community and Euratom.20 
Article 26 of the ECT (“Settlement of Disputes between an Investor and a Contracting Party”) 
lays out the provisions for the resolution of disputes between a Contracting State and an 
investor of another Contracting State. It specifies which arbitration rules can qualify to arbitrate 
an ECT dispute, namely those of: 
 the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), based in 
Washington, D.C., 
 a sole arbitrator or an ad hoc arbitration tribunal under the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) or 
                                                     
16 See section on “The Energy Charter Treaty” on the International Energy Charter website. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 For a full ECT membership list, see its website.  
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 the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC). 
The most relevant ECT article for cases brought to the ECT regarding changes to renewable 
energy policy is the one on “fair and equitable treatment” (Article 10, reproduced in the box 
below). The violation of legitimate expectations as a result of the retroactive application of a 
law is not directly addressed in the ECT, but it is generally recognised by arbitration tribunals 
as one possible violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard. If a change in policy 
affects an investment to such an extent that it leads to significant losses, it can also be 
equivalent to expropriation, i.e. an action by a State that divests an owner of his/her 
investment. 
Article 10 “Promotion, protection and treatment of investments” 
(1) Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, encourage and 
create stable, equitable, favourable and transparent conditions for Investors of other Contracting 
Parties to make Investments in its Area. Such conditions shall include a commitment to accord 
at all times to Investments of Investors of other Contracting Parties fair and equitable treatment. 
Such Investments shall also enjoy the most constant protection and security and no Contracting 
Party shall in any way impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures their management, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal. In no case shall such Investments be accorded 
treatment less favourable than that required by international law, including treaty obligations. 
Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligations it has entered into with an Investor or an 
Investment of an Investor of any other Contracting Party.  
Finally, Article 10(12) states: “Each Contracting Party shall ensure that its domestic law provides 
effective means for the assertion of claims and the enforcement of rights with respect to 
investments, investment agreements, and investment authorisations”. 
In this context, three aspects of the ECT are of particular relevance: 
1) The ECT is the only existing multilateral agreement on investment protection and it is 
binding for member states as well as for the EU. The awards are binding and enforceable 
(State assets in other signatory countries can be seized). 
2) The ECT is an international treaty and at the same time part of EU law. 
3) The principles of the ECT were agreed with the full participation of the European Union.  
There is a concern that the EU may in some cases provide lower protection standards than the 
ECT. At the same time, the European Commission argues that EU law provides a full set of rules 
protecting investments, so that – unlike third-country investors – EU investors do not need an 
additional set of remedies. To uphold the EU’s principle of mutual reliance on national courts, 
however, this would require that the level of protection is comparable in all EU member states.  
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3.2 Questions on the validity of the ECT for intra-EU disputes 
The jurisdiction of the ECT has proven controversial, owing to the potential clash of this 
international treaty with the EU Treaties, which since 1958 has given the European Commission 
full competence on State aid and investor protection within the single market. The European 
Commission has challenged the jurisdiction of the ECT for intra-EU disputes, on the grounds 
that it does not conform to EU investment protection and State aid rules, and that for investors 
within the EU, EU law has supremacy. These arguments follow a similar line to the one upheld 
by the European Commission in its November 2016 Decision concerning a case against the 
Czech Republic (State Aid SA.40171 (2015/NN) – Czech Republic Promotion of electricity 
production from renewable energy sources, EC(2016) 7827 final). Paragraph 147 states:  
In case of the Energy Charter Treaty, it is also clear from the wording, the objective and the 
context of the treaty that it does not apply in an intra-EU situation in any event. In general, 
when negotiating – as in the case of the Energy Charter Treaty – multilateral agreements 
as a “block”, the Union and its Member States only intend to create international 
obligations vis-à-vis third countries, but not inter se. That has been particularly clear in case 
of the Energy Charter Treaty, which had been initiated by the Union in order to promote 
investment flows from the then European Communities to the East, and energy flows in 
the opposite direction, as part of the external action of the European Communities. It is 
also borne out by the wording of Articles 1(3) and 1(10) of the Energy Charter Treaty, which 
defines the area of a regional economic integration organisation as the area of that 
organisation. The lack of competence of Member States to conclude inter se investment 
agreements and the multiple violations of Union law set out above in recitals (143) to (145) 
also constitute relevant context for the interpretation of the Energy Charter Treaty in 
harmony with Union law, so as to avoid treaty conflict. 
Tim Maxian Rusche (2017), an authority on EU renewable electricity law and policy, clarifies 
this position in an analysis of the situation between the EU Treaties and the ECT. He asserts 
that international arbitration sentences cannot be upheld for intra-EU disputes on State aid, 
arguing that within the EU, only the European Commission can determine whether a given 
change in State aid is compatible with the internal market, and thus can be authorised. As a 
consequence, the ECT can only apply to third countries. He also argues that the ECT recognises 
the EU as a “Regional Economic Integration Organization” (REIO), as the concept was 
specifically created to address the special nature of the EU. 
To date, arbitration tribunals have rejected the EU’s and member states’ claims of lack of 
jurisdiction for intra-EU disputes. International lawyers disagree whether the EU has been 
officially recognised by parties to the ECT as a REIO, as formally required in Article 1(3) of the 
ECT. This has allowed a legal incompatibility to emerge in two separate but overlapping 
jurisdictions. The European Union and its member states are all founders and parties to the ECT 
and therefore are also individually bound by it. Thus, even if member states find themselves in 
breach of State aid rules when paying court-mandated compensation to investors, the 
arbitration awards are still binding. It is not in the remit of the arbitration tribunals to consider 
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this legal incompatibility. These can only focus on the merit of the claimants’ specific case, i.e. 
whether their rights have been infringed by the State.  
Maxian Rusche (2017, p. 9), however,  notes that awards still require approval by the European 
Commission, because according to the arbitration tribunals’ own provisions “ICSID 
(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) awards have to be recognised as 
if they were judgments of national courts that have acquired res iudicata (Art. 54 of ICSID 
Convention)”. From this interpretation, it follows that since State aid is an exclusive 
competence of the EU, such an award in a national court would itself only be valid if the 
Commission, under the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), 
approves the compensation for the investors. 
Maxian Rusche (ibid.) further argues that because investors and governments within the EU 
are bound to respect the supremacy of EU law for intra-EU disputes, they should abstain from 
using the ECT and instead bring their cases before the national courts, which are authorised to 
refer cases to the CJEU, or – depending on the case – directly to the Court in Luxembourg. In 
sum, governments abiding by an arbitration award and paying compensation to investors may 
be subject to infringement procedures for providing illegal State aid, as transferring money to 
investors is considered a subsidy. From a purely legal point of view this is a valid argument. The 
single market prohibits compensating some investors and not others.  
The problem, from a legal viewpoint, is the existence of two parallel jurisdictions: Arbitration 
tribunals claim that they have full jurisdiction, because the ECT is binding on individual member 
states, while EU law considers that the approval of State aid and any compensation to investors 
is a full competence of the European Commission and that the EU should be treated as a REIO. 
Both arguments are valid, but they are unfortunately incompatible with one another. 
4. Potential solutions to the stalemate 
As early as 2011, a professor of law specialising in international commercial arbitration, Jan 
Kleinheisterkamp, identified a lack of clarity regarding the status of the EU in the ECT. He argued 
that although the ECT was originally designed to protect EU energy investors in Central and 
Eastern Europe, it was “partially also, from the very beginning an ‘original intra-EU’ agreement 
even previous to the two accession waves. The ECT does not contain any limitations regarding 
its applicability among the ‘old’ EU member states” (Kleinheisterkamp, 2011, p. 15). The 
European Commission, however, dissented from this view, arguing that the EU is a single 
market and should thus be treated by arbitration tribunals as a Regional Economic Integration 
Organization, as provided for under Article 1(3) ECT. According to the European Commission 
the term REIO was created to cater for the specific case of the EU, and thus questions why 
arbitration tribunals do not follow this interpretation. This issue remains unresolved, as 
reflected in the decisions of the arbitration tribunals.  
Countering the opinion of the Commission, some interviewees argue that it was already evident 
when the ECT was signed that cases could potentially become the subject of intra-EU 
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arbitration; thus, member states implicitly accepted differential treatment for intra-EU cross-
border investments. 
Kleinheisterkamp (2011) argues that a solution would be to recognise the EU as a REIO in the 
ECT, but it would not suffice for the European Commission to simply take the decision to do so. 
The European Council would need to give a mandate to the European Commission to represent 
the EU and its member states in the context of the ECT. A more far-reaching option would be 
for EU member states to formally declare that the ECT does not have legal jurisdiction in intra-
EU investor-state disputes. 
The ease of obtaining a mandate by a qualified majority vote from the European Council, 
however, is not self-evident. One cannot assume that a sufficient number of member states 
would endorse such a proposal as long as the judicial systems across EU member states are not 
universally perceived as having de facto equivalent standards. Some member states may argue 
that national judicial bodies in other EU member states do not provide sufficient protection to 
investors from their own country, and that the present system does not ensure the same level 
of protection as the ECT. The desire to offer higher protection to national investors operating 
in other member states may trump the Union’s principle of mutual trust in national judicial 
systems (including the right to address the CJEU in second instance). 
Another practical solution would be for the EU to create an exception, whereby intra-EU 
arbitration rulings under the ECT are accepted as valid for existing investments. After all, the 
ECT has been successfully used by EU investors as a means of defending their operations in 
non-EU countries. But implementation of such a proposal poses difficulties because it would 
violate primary law and require a change of the EU Treaties. This exception would address the 
concern that when a new State aid is approved by the European Commission, it does not per 
se imply that existing investors have been treated fairly during the transition process to the new 
regime. Interviewees representing investors expressed concern that compliance of a State aid 
with EU provisions does not address investors’ rights to a reasonable level, nor ensure legal 
certainty, avoidance of retroactive changes and protection against changes that would be 
equivalent to expropriation. Even though EU law and the CJEU would in principle protect them, 
they claim that this is not the case in practice.  
Such an exception, however, still does not solve the conundrum of treating national investors 
differently than investors from another EU member state – unless the outcome automatically 
becomes valid for all EU investors. And such an outcome would pose an even greater 
conundrum: Would the European Council approve such an extension of rights to national 
investors, given the potential large costs of extending such an award to all concerned investors?  
In November 2016 a reform proposal of the renewable energy Directive introduced specific 
wording against policy changes with retroactive effects.21 This is welcome as it makes a clear 
                                                     
21 Proposal for a Directive on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (recast) COM(2016) 767 
final: “An EU-level framework setting out high-level principles for support schemes would also provide investor 
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statement that retroactive changes must be avoided, and offers the possibility that the 
European Commission can launch infringement procedures. It could also be made enforceable 
in national courts, and, eventually, in the CJEU. 
It is questionable, however, whether this could be considered equivalent to providing a direct 
channel to investors through a dispute settlement mechanism, with provisions on fairness, 
legitimate expectations, equitable treatment and expropriation (as contained in Articles 10 and 
13 of the ECT). Arbitration cases to date have also not accepted the claims of retroactivity, 
focusing instead on legitimate expectations and the disproportionate nature of the policy 
changes. Still, the present wording in the proposed Directive is an important step towards 
clarifying and strengthening investor protection. Formally, the protection provided will apply 
only once the new Directive enters into force on 1 January 2021, and therefore will only cover 
future cases. For the cases prior to 2021, some interviewees argue that the principles of 
Community Law recognise the protection of investors’ legitimate expectations, and that any 
infringement could be challenged in the CJEU. 
It is important to highlight that effectively protecting investors’ rights, on the one hand, and 
opening an infringement procedure, on the other, are not comparable actions. In the first 
instance, investors are able to bring their cases to court and benefit from a trial, while the 
second instance primarily involves a dispute between the European Commission and a national 
government regarding the implementation of the Directive. The latter does not address specific 
violations of investors’ rights nor does it award compensation for damages suffered. 
It is reasonable to raise the question of whether the European Commission should not review 
the State aid rules and their implementation, to ensure that they are adapted to safeguard the 
proper functioning of the internal market, as well as to create the positive investment 
framework required by the existing and future renewable energy Directive. 
To prevent the EU investment framework from being further undermined by the increasing 
number of legal challenges in arbitration courts, the European Commission services responsible 
for financial markets, energy and business development should become more proactively 
involved in finding a workable solution to reassure EU investors that EU provisions provide the 
necessary level of protection.  
5. Summary and conclusions 
The objective of this paper has not been to analyse in detail the respective legal provisions, nor 
to defend the conflicting positions of the arbitration courts and the European Commission: 
arbitration courts agree on the fact that the Energy Charter Treaty has intra-EU jurisdiction, 
                                                     
certainty, which may have been undermined in the past by the stop and go policy – and sometimes retroactive 
measures – taken by certain Member States.” (p.7); “(…) principles for Member States to use for support schemes 
and the protection for investors against retroactive changes (p.13)”. 
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whereas the European Commission disagrees and points out that recourse to arbitration under 
the ECT is not in line with EU legislation on investor protection nor on State aid.  
Both positions are internally consistent, but neither provides a solution for investors who find 
themselves trapped in-between. This is detrimental to the European Union’s reputation as an 
investor-friendly destination and discourages investment in renewable energy. Arbitration 
courts themselves cannot modify their position, as it is not in their remit to reinterpret the ECT. 
The official position of the European Commission rests on the supremacy of the EU State aid 
rules and investor protection provisions in the Treaties. Regardless of the merit of this position, 
what cannot be disregarded is that the arbitration tribunals have performed a thorough 
assessment of the claims, and in their latest case have ruled in favour of the claimants. In this 
instance, the court found evidence in Spain of breaches of Articles 10 and 13 of the ECT and 
awarded compensation to the claimants. If confirmed on appeal, such awards may be repeated 
in future law suits, based on comparable grounds as argued against the same set of Spanish 
reforms. Such cases, in fact, are already lining up. 
The ruling is based on principles that all parties to the ECT have agreed to adhere to. Rejecting 
the award on the grounds of the supremacy of EU State aid rules and the lack of applicability 
of the ECT within the EU does not address the fundamental need to achieve the EU’s key 
objectives, i.e. meeting the GHG emissions reduction targets, coupled with providing a stable 
environment for investors. As a result, the present policy stance will be increasingly vulnerable 
to challenges.  
This study suggest the following options as possible means of addressing this dilemma: 
 The EU could recognise arbitration rulings under the ECT until the member states agree 
in the Council of the EU to clarify whether or not the ECT applies between them. The ECT 
lays out standards for investor protection that the EU adheres to. Rejecting the awards 
seems equivalent to lowering protection standards within the EU. In consequence, a legal 
battle on ECT applicability within the EU will be detrimental to the EU’s reputation as a 
leader in RES and damaging to investors’ confidence.  
 The arbitration rulings should also be used as a precedent for national investors, as no 
distinction should be drawn within the single market between national and other EU 
investors. According to the legal experts interviewed for this study, the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness should apply. Under EU law, the principle of equivalence 
requires the same remedies and procedural rules to be available to claims based on EU 
law as are extended to analogous claims of a purely domestic nature. While the ECT is 
not ‘European Law’, its principles are subscribed to by both the European Commission 
and the member states. Following the principles of equivalence, effectiveness and 
equality, any EU member state found by a tribunal to have breached the ECT should 
upgrade its legal provisions on the treatment of existing investments to the highest-
performing protection system. 
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 While the preceding option could offer a way to honour the point that “ICSID awards 
have to be recognised as if they were judgments of national Courts” (Article 54 of the 
ICSID Convention), the approval of support and compensation to investors remains an 
exclusive competence of the European Commission. Given the extensive analysis carried 
out by the arbitration courts, the Commission could use the findings as a guide to 
determine how to compensate investors during the transition to the new regime.  
 There seems to be a need to clarify which possibilities of recourse are available to 
investors at the EU level, in the event that national courts perform poorly. Amongst 
others, an intra-EU arbitration system has been suggested. Such a system would 
complement the principle of mutual trust in the legal systems of the EU, on which the 
Union is based. For example, the CJEU could play a clearer arbitration role for investor-
State disputes.  
Finding a solution that provides legal clarity while appropriately and effectively protecting 
investors from radical and damaging policy reversals would provide multiple advantages It 
would: i) avoid the loss of investor confidence in the short-term; ii) restore the EU’s reputation 
as an investor-friendly destination; iii) prevent a back-log of international arbitration cases 
under the ECT; and iv) send a signal that investment in the EU energy sector is safe and 
protected by coherent legal rules. 
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